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REPLACING THE CRAZY QUILT
OF INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
JURISPRUDENCE WITH
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
JOHN C. NAGEL
Crazy quilts can be useful and there are occasions when inele-
gance in the legal system works, but this is definitely not one of
those occasions.'
INTRODUCTION
The primary gatekeeper at the door to the federal courts of
appeals is the rule that only final judgments are appealable.' The
final judgment rule has performed this role well, for the most
part.' In certain cases, however, a trial court's error on an inter-
locutory issue is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment. To deal with this type of injustice, the courts and Con-
gress have created a patchwork of exceptions to the final judgment
rule.
Dissatisfaction with this patchwork is now widespread.4 With
1. Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 170, 172.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) ("The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts .... ").
3. Most commentators who advocate reform recommend keeping the final judgment
rule but creating certain exceptions. The only ones who recommend abolishing the final
judgment rule are those who favor abolishing appeals as of right altogether. Compare
Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1984, at 165, 165-66 (advocating final judgment rule plus categories of
interlocutory appeals) and Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 747 (1993) (advo-
cating final judgment rule plus discretionary review) and Randall J. Turk, Note, Toward
a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A Proposal to Amend 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1025, 1038 (1979) (advocating final judgment rule plus one new category of inter-
locutory appeals) with Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41
YALE L.J. 539, 564 (1932) (arguing for the elimination of appeals as of right) and
Harlon L. Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62
(1985) (same).
4. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
this consensus, and with the passage of 28 U.S.C. sections 1292(e)
and 2072(c), which give the Supreme Court the power to make
rules clarifying appellate jurisdiction,' the time has come to un-
stitch this crazy quilt so that litigants can spend more time arguing
about the merits of their cases and less time arguing about when
they can argue. The rulemakers should use their new power to
adopt the discretionary approach recommended by the American
Bar Association (ABA) and implemented in Wisconsin.6 This
approach eliminates the ineffective judicially created exceptions to
the final judgment rule, avoids the intractable problem of creating
a formula to identify ex ante all orders deserving of interlocutory
review, and provides the courts of appeals with a relief valve for
orders that may result in harsh consequences if appeal is delayed
until a final decision. The rulemakers, Congress, and the courts
should then proceed to refine this discretionary scheme by identi-
fying classes of orders that will generally or always be allowed or
denied interlocutory review.
Part I of this Note relates the current state of the law of
federal circuit court jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from
the district courts. Part II examines the recent ABA recommenda-
tion for discretionary review, which has been adopted in Wiscon-
sin, and concludes that broad discretionary review is the best way
to identify orders appropriate for interlocutory review.7 Part III
applies the recommended discretionary standards to two recent
cases, Reise v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 95 (1990). The
Committee explained,
The state of the law on when a district court ruling is appealable because it is
"final," or is an appealable interlocutory action, strikes many observers as un-
satisfactory in several respects. The area has produced much purely procedural
litigation. Courts of appeals often dismiss appeals as premature. Litigants some-
times face the possibility of waiving their right to appeal when they fail to seek
timely review because it is unclear when a decision is "final" and the time for
appeal begins to run. Decisional doctrines-such as "practical finality" and espe-
cially the "collateral order" rule-blur the edges of the finality principle, require
repeated attention from the Supreme Court, and may in some circumstances
restrict too sharply the opportunity for interlocutory review.
Id. See also Carrington, supra note 3, at 165-66; Martineau, supra note 3, at 747.
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(e), 2072(c) (Supp. V 1993).
6. See infra note 110.
7. This Note analyzes the process by which courts identify those orders that should
be allowed interlocutory review. I recommend that the general process embedded in the
Wisconsin-ABA approach-broad discretionary review-be adopted. I do not address in
detail the adequacy of any specific standards used to single out orders for interlocutory
review.
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System' and Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc.,9 and concludes that the analysis would often col-
lapse into an evaluation of the merits of the appeal and that the
standards may need refinement.
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
A. The Final Judgment Rule
The final judgment rule can be traced to the writ of error at
English common law.'0 The rule developed because at common
law an appellate court was required to consider the entire record.
This requirement made appeals before a final decision problematic
because it was difficult for the King's Bench and the trial court to
review the record simultaneously. Equity courts, not limited by
this formality, applied a more flexible standard, allowing some
appeals before a final decision.' In 1789, the United States Con-
gress chose to adopt the common law approach to appeals as part
of its basic grants of appellate jurisdiction 3 and the final judg-
ment requirement remains intact, in large part, today. 4
8. 957 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1992).
9. 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993).
10. 15A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3906,
at 264 (1992).
11. Gerald T. Wetherington, Appellate Review of Final and Non-Final Orders in
Florida Civil Cases-An Overview, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 61, 62.
12. Id. For a thorough discussion of the early history of the final judgment rule, see
15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3906, at 264-68.
13. See The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83-87:
[Section 21:] [F]rom final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of
three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed to the next
circuit court ....
[Section 22:] [Flinal decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court,
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive
of costs, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court . . .
upon a writ of error .... And upon a like process, may final judgments and
decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court . . . where the
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive
of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court ....
[Section 25:] [A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of
law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had . . . may
be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United
States upon a writ of error ....
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988) ("The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . ").
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
Delay of appellate review until the trial court proceedings are
complete has several advantages. First, many issues that a party
seeks to appeal before a final decision may become moot upon
the disposition of the case on the merits." Second, piecemeal ap-
peals threaten the independence of trial judges. 6 Third, the final
judgment rule "avoid[s] the obstruction to just claims that would
come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of
separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation may
give rise."' 7
Despite the advantages of the final judgment rule, certain
interlocutory orders are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final decision.'" A strict application of the final judgment rule can
produce harsh consequences for litigants who are unable to chal-
lenge a prejudicial and erroneous pre-final order. For example, in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., the district court
wrongfully refused to condition the plaintiff's continuation of his
derivative suit upon his posting bond. 9 The right to have bond
posted during trial would have been irreparably lost had the de-
fendant been refused appeal until the trial was completed." Cases
involving preliminary injunctions are another example because the
failure to prevent or require some action before a final decision is
issued may irreparably harm a party.21
The battle between these competing concerns 22 explains why
the Supreme Court, despite the clarity of the statutes conferring
15. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380
(1987).
16. See, e.g., Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1984) ("[The final
judgment rule] helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate-court
interference with the numerous decisions they must make in the pre-judgment stages of
litigation."). Similar arguments underlie the relationship between the final judgment re-
quirement for U.S. Supreme Court review of state court decisions and the independence
of state courts. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3908, at 284-90.
17. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (quoting
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940)).
18. Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (1990).
19. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). For a more complete discussion of Cohen, see infra
text accompanying notes 29-44.
20. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
21. Solimine, supra note 18, at 1169.
22. For a more thorough discussion of the benefits and detriments of interlocutory
review, see Edward H. Cooper, Timing as Jurisdiction: Federal Civil Appeals in Context,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 157, 157-58; Crick, supra note 3; Note,
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 351-53 (1961).
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appellate jurisdiction,' for many years failed to apply the final
judgment rule rigidly, eschewing a clear definition of "final judg-
ment. 2 4 In 1945, in Catlin v. United States, the Court appeared to
settle the controversy in favor of precluding interlocutory appeals
when it held that a final order is "one which ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment."'
B. Over, Under, and Around the Final Judgment Rule
Catlin, however, could not overcome dissatisfaction with the
inflexibility of the final judgment rule. In a patchwork process that
continues today, both Congress and the courts have proceeded to
weave a crazy quilt of exceptions, which are often "overlap-
ping ... [and] each less lucid than the next."26 What follows is a
brief description of the most significant exceptions to the rule.27
23. See supra notes 13-14.
24. See, e.g., McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892)
("Probably no question of equity practice has been the subject of more frequent discus-
sion in this court than the finality of decrees . . . . The cases, it must be conceded, are
not all together harmonious.").
25. 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
26. Carrington, supra note 3, at 166.
27. Less significant exceptions to the final judgment rule include the Forgay v.
Conrad rule, the appeal of attorney's fees orders, the appeal of bankruptcy orders, the
Gillepsie balancing approach, and the death knell doctrine. See Martineau, supra note 3,
at 738-46; Turk, supra note 3, at 1033-38.
The Forgay v. Conrad rule is a narrow exception that allows appeal in the rare
case when a court orders a transfer of property but retains jurisdiction for accounting
purposes. Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848); Martineau, supra note 3,
at 738-39. In Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202 (1988), the Su-
preme Court adopted a rule whereby orders concerning attorney's fees are per se appeal-
able regardless of the status of the decision on the merits.
Interlocutory appeals from bankruptcy court orders have been allowed more liberal
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), Supp. V (1993) because many interlocutory orders in
bankruptcy cases conclusively resolve the rights of parties. Martineau, supra note 3, at
745. In Gillepsie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964), the Supreme
Court articulated a balancing approach to interlocutory appeals, allowing the appeal of an
interlocutory order because the costs of continuing the litigation before an appeal out-
weighed the costs of piecemeal review. Id. at 153. This potentially sweeping new ap-
proach to interlocutory appeals has been "criticized by the commentators and avoided by
the courts." Turk, supra note 3, at 1034. Finally, according to the death knell doctrine,
an order is final if that order as a practical matter ends the litigation even though no
formal final order has been entered. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3912, at
439. This theory serves as an adjunct to the collateral order doctrine and prevents injus-
tice when orders involve the merits of the case. Id. at 440.
INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. The Collateral Order Doctrine. Only four years after the
articulation of a rigid final judgment rule in Catlin,' the Court
retreated when it pronounced the collateral order doctrine in Co-
hen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.29 Cohen was a
shareholder's derivative suit in which the district court refused to
apply a statute of the forum state. This statute required the plain-
tiff in a derivative suit to post bond to cover the defendant's costs
in the event the suit turned out to be frivolous." The appellate
court heard the appeal on the grounds that the issue was collateral
and "final in its nature. 3 1
As a threshold question, the Supreme Court considered
whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 2
Although the order was not formally part of a final decision, Jus-
tice Jackson, writing for a unanimous Court, reasoned that 28
U.S.C. § 1291 should be given a "practical rather than a technical
construction. 3 3 To define a "final decision" under section 1291,
the Court looked to the purpose of the statute, which is to "com-
bine in one review all stages of the proceeding that effectively
may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment re-
sults."'
Justice Jackson listed four characteristics of the order in ques-
tion that, when all are present, make an order effectively final and
suitable for interlocutory appeal. First, the order was not "tenta-
tive, informal or incomplete."'35 Second, the order was separate
from the merits of the case.36 Third, delay of review risked seri-
ous irreparable harm to the defendant. 37 Finally, the disputed or-
der presented a "serious and unsettled question. 38
After Cohen, several commentators predicted that courts
would construe the collateral order doctrine broadly until little
28. 324 U.S. 229, 243 (1945).
29. 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
30. Id. at 544-45.
31. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1948) (quoting
United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926)).
32. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545.
33. Id. at 546.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 547.
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would be left of the final judgment rule.39 This trend never mate-
rialized. 4' The Supreme Court has limited interlocutory appeals
under the collateral order doctrine to a small class of cases.41
A clear signal of the Court's unwillingness to apply broadly
the collateral order doctrine came in Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-
say.42 The Court denied the interlocutory appeal of a decertifi-
cation order in a class action suit because the challenged order
met none of the Cohen requirements.43 The Court restated the
Cohen test in a frequently cited passage: the order in question
"must [1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve
an important issue [3] completely separate from the merits of the
action, and [4] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment."'
Whether an order "conclusively determines" an issue depends
on the appellate court's assessment of the likelihood of reconsider-
ation. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion Corp., the Court held that the challenged order granting a
stay, although not conclusive in a technical sense, was final in
practice.45 Virtually any order is not formally final until the trial
judge signs it, because until then the judge has the power to alter
it.46 The Court held, however, that an unsigned order is not what
the Coopers & Lybrand Court meant by "inherently tentative. '47
The dividing line between interlocutory and final orders is marked
not by the formal ability to revise, but instead by the reasonable
likelihood of revision.48
In contrast, in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp.,41 the Court considered an interlocutory appeal of an order
denying a motion for a stay. The Court held that the order was
39. See, e.g., Theodore D. Frank, Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L.
REv. 292, 301-02, 317-20 (1966).
40. Solimine, supra note 18, at 1171.
41. Id.
42. 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
43. Id. at 469.
44. Id. at 468. For a list of Supreme Court and circuit court decisions applying the
Coopers & Lybrand formula, see 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3911, at 349
n.59.
45. 460 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983).
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id. at 12 n.14.
48. See id.
49. 485 U.S. 271 (1988).
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"inherently tentative."5 "[A] district court usually will expect to
revisit and reassess an order denying a stay in light of events
occurring in the normal course of the litigation.""
Most courts have paid little attention to the "importance" re-
quirement.' A handful of courts, however, have rejected appeals
at least in part on the grounds that the order in question was not
important. 3
The "separate from the merits" requirement serves to recon-
cile interlocutory appeals with some of the goals of the final judg-
ment rule. 4 Interlocutory review of orders that are collateral to
the merits does not disrupt the trial court proceedings and does
not require the reviewing court to refamiliarize itself with the
merits of the case upon final appeal. However, the collateral
requirement sometimes is swept aside by concerns of hardship to
litigants denied effective review 6 The paradigmatic example of
an order that is separate from the merits is the order denying
security in Cohen.7 An example of an order that is not collateral
is an order dismissing counterclaims on a motion for summary
judgment.
The requirement of "effective unreviewability" is the "'central
focus' and perhaps even the 'dispositive criterion' of appellate
50. Id. at 278.
51. Id.
52. 9 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 110.10, at 71-72
(2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1993-1994).
53. E.g., Minnesota v. Pickands Mather & Co., 636 F.2d 251, 255 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that an order denying leave to file a third-party complaint for contribution
against a former codefendant "does not present a 'serious and unsettled' question of
law"); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1298 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980) (observ-
ing that refusal to modify protective discovery order did not present an important and
unsettled question).
54. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3911.2, at 379; see supra text accompa-
nying notes 15-17.
55. 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3911.2, at 379-80.
56. 15A id. at 379. For example, in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527-29 (1985),
the Court allowed the interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion for dismissal based
on qualified official immunity, despite the entanglement of the official immunity claim
with the merits of the case.
57. See 15A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 3911.2, at 380-81.
58. See, e.g., Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 568 F.2d 1203, 1207 (5th Cir.
1978) ("The district court's decision that certain counterclaims must fail ...is a decision
sustaining a substantive defense to the cause of action asserted; it is a 'step toward the
final disposition of the merits of the case.'" (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949))).
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jurisdiction" over interlocutory appeals under the collateral order
doctrine. 9
[A]n order is "effectively unreviewable" only "where the order at
issue involves 'an asserted right the legal and practical value of
which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before tri-
al.'" . . . It is always true . . . that "there is value . . . in tri-
umphing before trial, rather than after it," and this Court has
declined to find the costs associated with unnecessary litigation to
be enough to warrant allowing the immediate appeal of a pretrial
order.6
Thus, for example, a litigant claiming absolute or qualified immu-
nity from suit could obtain interlocutory review of an order deny-
ing a motion to dismiss. 1 The immunity from the burdens and
expenses of litigation would be destroyed if the trial were allowed
to continue.62 Conversely, a litigant claiming that a court lacks
jurisdiction cannot obtain interlocutory review, because "the right
not to be subject to a binding judgment may be effectively vindi-
cated following final judgment."'63
Despite the Court's attempt to clarify the collateral order
doctrine in Coopers & Lybrand and several other cases, the doc-
trine has proved unsatisfactory as a cure for the rigidity of the
final judgment rule. It has been costly in terms of judicial and
party resources,64 and the results have been mixed at best. The
test often is applied inconsistently from circuit to circuit,65 and
courts sometimes reduce the requirements to an ad hoe balancing
test. 6 Judge Posner accurately observed that
59. Boreri v. Fiat S.P.A., 763 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting In re San Juan
Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 112 (1st Cir. 1981)); see also Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d
1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986) (reaching the same conclusion), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1049
(1987).
60. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1989) (citations omitted).
61. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-43 (1982).
62. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985).
63. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527 (1988).
64. See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986) (observing
that the collateral order doctrine has "spawned an immense jurisprudence"). As of Sep-
tember 1994, 1,380 reported federal cases discussed the "collateral order doctrine." Search
of Westlaw, Allfeds database (Sept. 6, 1994).
65. Compare, e.g., Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that an order compelling a physical examination under Rule 35 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is not appealable under the collateral order. doctrine) with
Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 207-08 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting interlocutory
review of a similar order).
66. See, e.g., Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[ln the unique
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as with so many multi-"pronged" legal tests [the collateral order
doctrine] manages to be at once redundant, incomplete, and
unclear. The second "prong" is part of the third. If the order
sought to be appealed is not definitive, an immediate appeal is
not necessary to ward off harm; there is no harm yet. The first
"prong" seems unduly rigid; if an order unless appealed really
will harm the appellant irreparably, should the fact that it in-
volves an issue not completely separate from the merits of the
proceeding always prevent an immediate appeal?67
2. Mandamus Review-28 U.S.C. § 1651. The writ of man-
damus provides a second route for litigants to obtain review of
interlocutory orders. As with the final judgment rule, the power to
issue extraordinary writs can be traced to the first Judiciary Act. 8
The current version of the All Writs Act provides that "[t]he
Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."'69
Appellate courts should use the writ of mandamus only "to
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed
jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its
duty to do so."7 Mandamus is a "drastic and extraordinary
remed[y]"' and should be used only "where there is clear abuse
instance where the issue is not 'collateral' but justice may require immediate review, a
balancing approach should be followed ...."); Shakur v. Malcolm, 525 F.2d 1144, 1147
(2d Cir. 1975) ("[Tlhe Cohen exception, as applied, has evolved into a balancing test
with the disadvantages of piecemeal appeal weighed against the importance of the ques-
tions raised by the interlocutory order.").
67. Palmer, 806 F.2d at 1318.
68. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §14, 1 stat. 73, 81-82 ("[A]II the before-men-
tioned courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas
corpus . . . and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be neces-
sary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and
usages of law.").
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. V 1993).
70. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953) (quoting
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)). Many cases have cited this
formulation of the purpose of extraordinary writs. See, e.g., Allied Chem. Corp. v.
Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661
(1978); Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Will v. United
States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325
U.S. 196, 202 (1945); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 (1943).
71. Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259 (1947).
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of discretion or 'usurpation of judicial power' ......72 Extraordi-
nary writs should not be used as a general substitute for ap-
peals.73
Despite the drastic nature of a mandamus writ, some circuit
courts use it as a general method of hearing appeals of interlocu-
tory orders.74 Reliance on a writ of mandamus for interlocutory
review is risky, however. The standards are stringent' and the
writ is granted not as a matter of right, but as a matter of judicial
discretion.76 A litigant's chances of obtaining review are best
when there is a "clear and indisputable" demonstration of error77
or "new and important problems" of law at stake.78
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1292. The most significant statutory excep-
tions to the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 are set out in
section 1292.' 9 Section 1292(a)(1) gives the courts of appeals ju-
risdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts of the
United States ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions,
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court ... ."80
The boundaries of section 1292(a)(1) are determined by the
interlocutory nature of the order in question, not by the interlocu-
tory relief at issue.8 Thus, clearly within section 1292(a)(1) are
interlocutory orders directly granting or refusing to grant prelimi-
nary injunctions as well as interlocutory orders granting permanent
injunctions.' More troublesome are interlocutory orders that have
72. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 346 U.S. at 383 (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Martineau, supra note 3, at 747. For a survey of cases delineating the use of the
writ of mandamus as a tool for interlocutory review, see 16 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3935 (1977 & Supp. 1994).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
76. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Parr v. United
States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325
U.S. 196, 202 (1945).
77. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967) (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953)).
78. Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Another exception for interlocutory
orders not favoring arbitration is found at 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). For a
brief discussion of § 16, see Martineau, supra note 3, at 734-36.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1988).
81. 16 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 74, § 3924, at 67.
82. 16 id.
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the practical effect of denying injunctive relief without directly
addressing injunctive consequences.8 For example, a court may
dismiss a claim requesting injunctive relief for lack of jurisdiction
or standing.' In such cases, section 1292(a)(1) allows appeal only
if the order "might have a 'serious ... consequence,' and ... the
order can be 'effectually challenged' only by immediate ap-
peal .. .
Section 1292(a)(2) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction to
hear appeals of interlocutory orders appointing receivers or refus-
ing to wind up receiverships. 6 Section 1292(a)(3) allows interlocu-
tory appeal from district court decrees in admiralty cases.87
Section 1292(b) supplements this categorical approach with a
two-step discretionary process for the interlocutory appeal of cer-
tain orders.' First, the party challenging an order must obtain
from the district court judge a written statement certifying the
order for appeal.89 The district judge's decision whether to certify
is discretionary.' In order to certify, the district court judge must
find that a "controlling question of law [is involved] as to which
there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and ... [the
immediate resolution of which] may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation .... , Once the district court
83. 16 id.
84. 9 MOORE El AL., supra note 52, 110.2011].
85. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981). For a more thorough
discussion of the scope of § 1292(a)(1), see 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, 110.2011];
16 WRIGHT El AL., supra note 74, §§ 3921-3924.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (1988).
87. Id. § 1292(a)(3).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) states in full:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially ad-
vance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in
such order. The Court of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal
of such action may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken
from such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of
the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall
not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court
of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
89. See id.
90. See D'Ippolito v. Cities Serv. Co., 374 F.2d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1967) ("[W]e can-
not conceive that we would ever mandamus a district judge to certify an appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) in plain violation of the Congressional purpose that such appeals should
be heard only when both the courts concerned so desire.").
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
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certifies, the court of appeals has complete discretion whether to
hear the appeal.92
Courts agree that an order involves a controlling question of
law if reversal of that order would require reversal of the final
judgment.93 Conversely, an order that would have little or no ef-
fect on subsequent proceedings is not controlling. 4 In considering
orders characterized by neither of these extremes, courts generally
turn to the "materially advance" prong of section 1292(b). The
result then turns on the likelihood that interlocutory appeal could
save the litigants and the court time and expense.95 The "substan-
tial ground for difference" requirement depends on the trial
court's estimation of the probability of reversal of the order in
light of the law within the court's circuit. 96
The "materially advance" requirement has posed some prob-
lems of interpretation. In addition to the requirement that interloc-
utory review shorten the proceedings, some courts have added the
requirement that the case be large and exceptional.97
4. Rule 54(b). Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure allows a judge to enter a final judgment for individual
claims in cases with multiple claims or parties or both.9 The rul-
92. See id.
93. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 74, § 3930, at 159.
94. 16 id.
95. 16 id. at 159-60; see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 755 (3d Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974). But see In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673
F.2d 1020, 1027 (9th Cir. 1982) (pointing out that this approach makes the controlling
question requirement superfluous), affd, 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). For a discussion of numer-
ous cases holding orders to be either controlling or not controlling, see 9 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 52, 110.22[2], at 268-76.
96. 16 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 74, § 3930, at 158-59.
97. Kraus v. Board of County Rd. Comm'rs, 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966);
United States Rubber Co. v. Wright, 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966); Gottesman v.
General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194, 196 (2d Cir. 1959). This added requirement has
been criticized. See 9 MOORE ET AL., supra note 52, 110.22[2], at 276 ("[Ciritics have
the better argument."); Solimine, supra note 18, at 1193-96. The House Report supports
the "big case" interpretation, but the Senate Report does not. Id. (referring to H.R. REP.
No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958); S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5255).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) states:
[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other
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ing involved must be otherwise final under section 1291 in order
to be eligible for Rule 54(b).99 The Rule was intended to protect
litigants whose claims are finally determined early in a complex
and protracted case."° Under Rule 54(b), such litigants do not
have to await a final decision on all claims if the trial judge certi-
fies the individual claim as final.' 1
5. The New Rulemaking Power-28 U.S.C. Sections 1292 and
2072. The Federal Courts Study Committee, created by statute in
1988102 to "make a complete study of the courts of the United
States,"'0 3 suggested that
[t]o deal with difficulties arising from definitions of an appealable
order, Congress should consider delegating to the Supreme Court
the authority under the Rules Enabling Act to define what con-
stitutes a final decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and to
define circumstances in which orders and actions of district courts
not otherwise subject to appeal under acts of Congress may be
appealed to the courts of appeals.' 4
Congress has adopted these recommendations. The Federal
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 199005 added
subsection (c) to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (the Rules Enabling Act), giv-
ing the Supreme Court the rulemaking power to define a "final"
decision under section 1291.'" In 1992, the Federal Courts Ad-
ministration Act' added subsection (e) to 28 U.S.C. § 1292,
giving the Supreme Court rulemaking power to create new catego-
ries of interlocutory appeals."m To date, however, the rulemakers
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, shall not termi-
nate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form
of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adju-
dicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties.
99. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956).
100. Turk, supra note 3, at 1031.
101. Id. at 1030.
102. Federal Courts Study Act, 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
103. FEDERAL COURTs STuDY COMM., supra note 4, at 31.
104. Id. at 95.
105. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5104, 5115.
106. As amended, § 2072(c) provides that "such rules may define when a ruling of a
district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291. ... 28 U.S.C. §
2072(c) (Supp. V 1993).
107. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat.
4506, 4506.
108. As amended, § 1292(e) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court may prescribe rules,
21319941
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have yet to exercise their powers under either section 1292(e) or
section 2072(c).
II. DISCRETIONARY INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
In a recent article, Professor Robert Martineau suggests that
Congress adopt the approach to appealability recommended by the
ABA and adopted in Wisconsin." The ABA recommends first
that only judgments that are formally final be appealable as of
right and second that interlocutory judgments be appealable only
by permission of the reviewing court.11 Before deciding how to
in accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory
decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a),
(b), (c), or (d)." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (Supp. V 1993).
109. Martineau, supra note 3, at 719.
110. ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.12, at 25 (1977) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The text of
§ 3.12 reads:
Appealable Judgments and Orders.
(a) Final Judgment. Appellate review ordinarily should be available only upon
the rendition of final judgment in the court from which appeal or application
for review is taken.
(b) Interlocutory Review. Orders other than final judgments ordinarily should
be subject to immediate appellate review only at the discretion of the reviewing
court where it determines that resolution of the questions of law on which the
order is based will:
(1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further
proceedings therein;
(2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or
(3) Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of justice.
Subsection (a) is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which provides that "[t]he courts of
appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts. ... Thus, the adoption of § 3.12(a) as it stands would do little to prune the
"practically final" exceptions to the final judgment rule such as the collateral order doc-
trine. What is missing from subsection (a), and is relegated to the comments following §
3.12, is a clear definition of "final." See ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 21-24.
The Wisconsin statute adopting the ABA recommendation remedies this deficiency:
(1) Appeals as of right. A final judgment or a final order of a [trial]
court may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of appeals unless oth-
erwise expressly provided by law. A final judgment or final order is a judgment
or order [entered in accordance with s. 806.06(1)(b) or 807.11(2) or a disposi-
tion recorded in docket entries in ch. 799 cases or traffic regulation or munic-
ipal ordinance violation cases prosecuted in circuit court] which disposes of the
entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties, whether rendered in
an action or special proceeding.
(2) Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not appealable as a
matter of right under sub. (1) may be appealed to the court of appeals in
advance of a final judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if it de-
termines that an appeal will:
(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further
proceedings in the litigation;
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fix appellate jurisdiction, reformers must remove the parts that do
not work. The first step of the ABA approach, which defines a
final order as one signed and filed by the trial judge, would ac-
complish this goal and should be implemented regardless of how
orders for interlocutory review are ultimately singled out."' By
saying that final means final,"' the proposed rule would elimi-
nate all judicially created exceptions"3 to the final judgment
rule." 4 With only the current statutory and rule-based exceptions
to the final judgment rule intact, Congress and rulemakers could
then reevaluate when to allow interlocutory appeals without worry-
ing about interference from the judicially created patches on the
crazy quilt. Eliminating judicially created exceptions to the final
judgment rule also would greatly simplify questions of appellate
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals and eliminate voluminous
satellite litigation of these procedural issues." 5
Reform of interlocutory appeals procedure should achieve two
basic goals. First, reformers should define a flexible category of or-
ders that would be appealable whenever, in the discretion of the
appellate court, justice or efficiency requires."6 This policy is ac-
(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or
(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of justice.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03 (West 1994).
111. This approach would not apply to reforms that would eliminate appeals as of
right altogether. See, e.g., the reforms discussed in the sources cited supra note 3.
112. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(1) provides that "[a] final judgment or final order is a
judgment or order entered in accordance with s. 806.06(1)(b) or 807.11(2) [i.e., when it is
filed with the office of the clerk of the court] ....
113. See supra Part I.
114. Although this simplification still would leave the writ of mandamus portion of
the quilt intact, the second part of the Wisconsin-ABA approach (broad discretionary
review) would remedy this situation. The writ of mandamus is not formally a judicially
created exception to the final judgment rule because it is authorized by statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 1651 (1988). Nevertheless, by creating a relief valve for interlocutory appeals,
extraordinary writs can return to the use for which they were intended-to remedy gross
abuses of judicial power.
115. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
116. For examples of such broad categories, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 32
(1951) ("[A] court of appeals, on the application of a party, may in its discretion autho-
rize an appeal from an interlocutory order, judgment or decree if such court determines
that such authorization is necessary or desirable to avoid substantial injustice.");
Carrington, supra note 3, at 167 ("The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from interlocutory orders of the district courts when essential to protect substantial rights
which cannot be effectively enforced on review after final decision."). One commentator
posited the following:
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complished by the second step of the Wisconsin-ABA approach,
which sets out two such broad categories." 7 Second, reformers
should attempt to identify any specific types of orders that should
presumptively be allowed or denied interlocutory appeal.
118
These narrow categories could be superimposed on the Wisconsin-
ABA approach whenever they would be helpful.
The broad "whenever justice requires" exception to the final
judgment rule reflected in the Wisconsin-ABA approach'1 9 pro-
vides potential relief to a litigant who is subject to an interlocutory
order that cannot be effectively reviewed on appeal. A broad
discretionary exception avoids the difficult, perhaps intractable,
problem of defining in advance all the categories of orders that
should be appealable before final decision. A purely categorical
approach would be both under- and overinclusive.
The type of order that should be appealable immediately will
vary from period to period and from case to case, depending
upon all of the variables that make one case different from an-
other. It is impossible to predict when in a particular case the
relative interests of the parties, the prospects for early termina-
tion of the case, or the public significance of the case will dictate
the advisability of an earlier rather than later review of an inter-
locutory order. Thus, attempting to classify interlocutory orders
for appeal purposes whether by statute, rule, or judicial decision,
can be nothing other 'than an exercise in futility."
Courts' experience with the collateral order doctrine confirms
this assessment. At its most basic level, the doctrine represents
When the court of appeals shall be of the opinion that delaying review of a
district court order not otherwise appealable under this section may render the
right of ultimate appeal of little or no value to the appellant, and that the cost
of delay in review to the appellant outweighs the cost of delay in trial to the
appellee, then it may permit an appeal to be taken from such order if, in its
discretion, it deems it likely that the order appealed from will be reversed.
Turk, supra note 3, at 1040.
117. These two categories are orders that if subjected to interlocutory appeal will
"materially advance the termination of the litigation" or "protect the petitioner from
substantial or irreparable injury." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(2)(a)-(b).
118. For example, Congress has decided that orders related to injunctions should cat-
egorically be allowed appeal. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85.
119. Under the Wisconsin approach, the criteria for discretionary review are whether
(1) the termination of the proceedings will be materially advanced, (2) the proceedings
will be clarified, (3) the litigant will suffer substantial or irreparable harm absent appeal,
or (4) appeal will clarify an issue of general importance. See Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 808.03(2).
120. Martineau, supra note 3, at 775.
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several decades of attempts to create a formula that would predict-
ably and accurately decide whether or not a given order should be
allowed interlocutory appeal."' These attempts failed because it
is impossible to define ex ante exactly what characteristics of a
given order make justice require its immediate review.
The requirements comprising the collateral order doc-
trine-con-clusiveness, importance, separability, and effective
unreviewability-are useful indicators. In different cases, however,
different factors dominate. For example, it may make sense to
allow interlocutory review of an order that is effectively unreview-
able on appeal after final decision and would result in serious
consequences for a litigant, even if that order is not truly collater-
al." This need for flexibility explains the unpredictability of the
outcome of attempts to appeal under the collateral order doctrine.
To some extent, this unpredictability already has made interlocuto-
ry appeals de facto a matter of circuit court discretion. It also
explains why courts have sometimes collapsed the collateral order
doctrine into a balancing of four factors rather than a check for
four requirements."' A discretionary scheme would end the cha-
rade and explicitly recognize the inefficacy of bright-line rules.
Regardless of how artfully the criteria guiding discretionary-
appeal are drafted, the decision to hear the appeal ultimately is
left to the discretion of the appellate court. Some uncertainty is
unavoidable. As Professor Rosenberg observed, "Judicial discretion
remains today one of the most intricate and mysterious of the
concepts judges and lawyers regularly encounter."'24 Ultimately,
the litigant must rely on the output of a black box. The circuit
courts could take steps to demystify the process by publishing
opinions giving prospective appellants guidance as to the courts'
reasoning in denying or permitting review. As the law of interlocu-
tory appeals stands currently, judges explain the interlocutory
appeals they deny or allow in the framework of the specific re-
quirements of the collateral order doctrine or of extraordinary
writs. If, as under the Wisconsin-ABA approach, appeals become
fully discretionary, the courts of appeals will have more freedom
to explain their underlying reasons for denying or allowing appeal.
121. See supra Section I(A).
122. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 66.
124. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 176.
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Wisconsin courts have not provided much guidance as to
when petitions for interlocutory review will likely be denied. They
have, however, indicated that three types of orders will generally
be allowed interlocutory appeal. In Baxter v. Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources,"z the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin ob-
served:
[I]f [a] motion to dismiss is based on a claim to qualified immu-
nity, an order denying the motion will usually satisfy the criteria
for granting a petition for leave to appeal under sec.
808.03(2) .... The critical nature of qualified immunity is such
that an order denying such a motion is treated as immediately
appealable under the federal rules. 26
Similarly in State v. Jenich,27 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
exhorted:
[W]e urge the court of appeals to be careful in exercising [its]
discretion when the order sought to be appealed is one which
denies a motion to dismiss for double jeopardy. Given the seri-
ous constitutional questions raised by claims of double jeopardy,
review of such orders will often be necessary to protect the ac-
cused from "substantial or irreparable injury"-one of the three
criteria for testing the appropriateness of review under sec.
808.03 (2 ).12
Finally in State ex rel. A.E. v. Circuit Court,29 the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin advised:3
Given the significance of a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction orders,
[which allow juveniles to be tried as adults,] we urge that the
court of appeals, in the exercise of its discretion, give careful
125. 477 N.W.2d 648 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
126. Id. at 650 n.3 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985)).
127. 292 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1980), overruded in part on other grounds, State v.
Copening, 303 N.W.2d 821 (Wis. 1981).
128. Id. at 349.
129. 292 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1980).
130. Under the Wisconsin system, the court of appeals has complete discretion wheth-
er to hear an appeal under Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(2). The Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin does not review the decision of the court of appeals to refuse to hear an interlocuto-
ry appeal. Town of Fitchburg v. City of Madison, 299 N.W.2d 199, 210 n.4 (Wis. 1980).
Presumably one could appeal a refusal to hear an interlocutory appeal if the court of ap-
peals refused to exercise its discretion. For example, the court of appeals cannot hold
that a certain class of orders is per se not appealable. Similarly, if the court of appeals
grounded its decision not to hear an appeal on unconstitutional grounds, the refusal
should be reversed.
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consideration to the merits presented by appeals from such or-
ders. Review will often be necessary to protect the minor from
"substantial or irreparable injury." .. . Juvenile waiver or-
ders ... represent a unique type of intermediate order which
require prompt appellate review where necessary to prevent
"substantial or irreparable injury." '31
The Wisconsin-ABA approach would not be a superfluous
addition to the discretionary review already available under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) is seldom a successful route to
an interlocutory appeal. Professor Solimine suggests that this re-
sults from circuit courts applying a big case requirement or nar-
rowly interpreting the statutory criteria.'32 Between 1985 and
1989, 1,411 interlocutory appeals were certified by district courts,
504 of which were accepted by circuit courts. 3 During the same
period, 179,998 appeals terminated after a final decision,"' and
approximately 21,000 interlocutory appeals were heard.135 The
Wisconsin-ABA reforms would provide litigants with a better
chance of having their petitions granted.
The Wisconsin-ABA approach, if implemented in the federal
courts, might increase the workload of the courts of appeals. The
courts of appeals would have to review each petition filed, which
would require some effort. Professor Martineau downplays the
potential for such a result, relying on the experience of the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals. Between 1988 and 1990, 6,222 appeals
131. State ex rel. A.E., 292 N.W.2d at 115-16.
132. Solimine, supra note 18, at 1193.
133. Id. at 1176.
134. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 106
(1990) (38,520 terminated appeals); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 137 (1989) (37,372 terminated appeals); ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 141 (1988) (35,888 terminated
appeals); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
138 (1987) (34,444 terminated appeals); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 138 (1986) (33,774 terminated appeals).
135. This figure is obtained by multiplying 180,000 by 12%, Judge Richard Posner's
estimated percentage of interlocutory appeals heard by federal courts. RICHARD A.
POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 72-73 (1985).
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were heard after final judgment in Wisconsin.136 There were 660
petitions for interlocutory review, 198 of which were granted.137
Although these statistics show that in recent years the Wiscon-
sin-ABA approach has not overburdened the Wisconsin system,
the numbers tell little of what impact this discretionary scheme
would have on the federal system. Without data on interlocutory
appeals before the implementation of the discretionary standards
in Wisconsin, it is unclear whether the discretionary scheme in-
creased the number of interlocutory appeals filed or heard. Judge
Richard Posner has estimated that 12% of appeals heard in the
federal courts occur before a final decision.3 Perhaps many
more are filed and dismissed; perhaps even more would be filed if
the Wisconsin-ABA approach were adopted in the federal system.
Without more data, one can only speculate.
Regardless, the decrease in satellite litigation that would result
from a clear definition of "final" '  would balance, at least in
part, any such increase in workload. 4 Furthermore, with the in-
herent flexibility of a discretionary rule, courts of appeals can limit
the time that they speid reviewing interlocutory petitions as the
drain on their resources demands.
The Wisconsin-ABA approach would function better than a
system that uses similar criteria for granting appeals as of right.
Broad categories in mandatory terms would likely lead to substan-
tial amounts of satellite procedural litigation construing the bound-
aries of these categories. Such litigation would resemble the flood
of litigation construing the bounds of the judicially created patches
on the crazy quilt that has wasted litigant and court time. Further-
more, broad mandatory categories are likely to become de facto
discretionary.
Admittedly, making appeals entirely discretionary inevitably
would produce unfairness in some cases. Under the present sys-
tem, if a litigant can meet the standards of the collateral order
doctrine, then the court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear the
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.141 Under the Wisconsin-ABA ap-
proach, even if a litigant satisfied one or more of the categories
136. Martineau, supra note 3, at 782-83.
137. Id.
138. See POSNER, supra note 135, at 72-73.
139. See supra text accompanying note 112.
140. See Martineau, supra note 3, at 784-85.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 33-38.
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for interlocutory appeal, the circuit court could refuse to hear the
appeal. 42 For example, the circuit court could conclude that its
docket is too crowded.
Isolated injustices, however, would not be avoided under a
scheme that would mandate hearing the interlocutory appeal once
certain criteria were met. A bright-line mandatory scheme would
produce injustice because such rules cannot identify all orders
appropriate for review.143 In any case, a broad mandatory catego-
ry scheme necessarily would become, to a large extent, de facto
discretionary' 44 and would produce the same isolated injustices as
well as additional satellite litigation.'45
The Wisconsin-ABA approach would not require resort to
statutory reform rather than rulemaking. Professor Martineau
criticizes the adoption of 28 U.S.C. sections 2072(c) and 1292(e)
because he believes that these provisions can be used only to
expand the scope of interlocutory appeals currently available. 46
With the passage of sections 2072(c) and 1292(e), the Wiscon-
sin-ABA approach can be implemented by rulemaking rather than
by statute. Nothing in the language of section 2072(c) 47 would
prevent the use of the rulemaking power to define final rigid-
ly.' Perhaps Professor Martineau's underlying concern is that he
believes that "[i]t is highly unlikely that the rulemakers" would
contract the meaning of final. 4 9
One could argue that the language of section 1292(e) does not
allow for the addition of a category to section 1292 that would
give the circuit courts discretion to hear appeals under the Wiscon-
sin-ABA approach, because under subsection (e), discretionary
appeals are already provided for under subsection (b). ° The
142. DAVID L. WALTHER ET AL., APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN WIS-
CONSIN § 9.2 (1993).
143. See supra text accompanying note 120.
144. See supra text following notes 122-23.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 67.
146. Martineau, supra note 3, at 772.
147. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (Supp. V 1993) ("Such rules may define when a ruling of a
district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 1291.").
148. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule: A
Comment on Martineau's "Right Problem, Wrong Sohtion," 54 U. PrIT. L. REV. 795,
799-800 (1993).
149. Martineau, supra note 3, at 772.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (Supp. V 1993) ("The Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in
accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocutory
decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a),
1994]
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adoption of a broad discretionary category would make subsection
1292(b) practically useless-there would be no need to ask both
the district court and the circuit court for permission to appeal
under more rigid standards when a litigant could seek permission
directly from the circuit court under broad standards. However,
this argument fails because the terms guiding discretion under the
Wisconsin-ABA approach are different from those guiding the
double discretion under subsection 1292(b) and thus are literally
"not otherwise provided for under [28 U.S.C. section 1292) subsec-
tion (a), (b), (c), or (d). '' 5
Finally, before implementing broad discretionary review, rule-
makers must recognize that other factors beyond those listed in
the broad discretionary category would influence an appellate
court's willingness to grant review. For example, if docket pres-
sures on the courts of appeals increase, the courts would become
much more reluctant to grant petitions for interlocutory re-
view.152 Another unavoidable factor would be an appellate
court's assessment of a particular trial court judge's competence.
An appellate court would be more receptive to requests for inter-
locutory review of an order issued by a judge that it believes to
be a habitual abuser of judicial discretion. Similarly, an appellate
court likely would look less carefully at requests for review of
orders from a trial court judge that it views favorably. These fac-
tors, in any case, probably play a significant role even under the
current system.
III. APPLICATION OF THE WISCONSIN-ABA APPROACH
Even if the rulemakers decide to adopt the Wisconsin-ABA
approach, many questions about the application of the standards of
discretion would remain. This Part examines two cases under the
Wisconsin-ABA standard, one involving discovery, the other in-
volving Eleventh Amendment state immunity. Applying the Wis-
(b), (c), or (d).").
151. Id; see Rowe, supra note 148, at 798 (reaching a similar conclusion).
152. See Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 177 ("The appellate court, with high volumes of
appeals of right pressing on it, now has to decide whether to add to its burden by ac-
cepting the certified interlocutory appeal as a matter of grace."). Higher caseloads also
would diminish the quality of the review of petitions for interlocutory review. Cf. Dalton,
supra note 3, at 63 (arguing that because caseload burdens on the courts of appeals have
increased, the quality of appellate review in general has diminished, in some cases to a
"mere formality").
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consin-ABA standards to these two cases demonstrates that the
controlling factor under the proposed approach often would be the
merits of the challenge to the order that a party seeks to appeal
before a final decision.
Applying the Wisconsin-ABA standards to interlocutory orders
involving discovery'53 and official immunity'1 4 is useful also be-
cause it demonstrates a potential need to refine the Wisconsin-
ABA approach in the future. If a class of orders such as those
involving official immunity should be allowed appeal in all cases
regardless of the merits of the appeal, then rather than forcing
appellate courts to repeat the time-consuming application of the
discretionary standards to these orders, it would be more efficient
to superimpose rules on the Wisconsin-ABA standards allowing
interlocutory appeal of these orders as a matter of right. Similarly,
if a class of orders, such as discovery orders, usually would not
satisfy the Wisconsin-ABA standards, then it would be helpful for
appellate courts to give prospective appellants notice of this fact.
A. Reise v. Board of Regents.55
Discovery orders present a difficult question in the interlocu-
tory review context because they often involve the discretion of a
trial judge (and thus an appellate court is unlikely to reverse),156
and yet appeal after a final decision may provide little relief.157
In the circuit courts, invocations of the collateral order doctrine to
appeal discovery orders have been largely unsuccessful.1 58 How-
153. Discovery orders generally are not allowed interlocutory appeal under current
law. See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
154. Orders involving questions of official immunity generally are allowed interlocutory
appeal under current law. See infra note 181.
155. 957 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1992).
156. See id. at 295.
157. Nicole E. Paolini, Note, The Cohen Collateral Order Doctrine: The Proper Vehicle
for Interlocutory Appeal of Discovery Orders, 64 TUL. L. REv. 215, 216 (1989).
158. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 519 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir.) (denying immediate
review of an order requiring party to answer interrogatory because review is available
upon refusal to obey the order), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975); Ryan v. Commission-
er, 517 F.2d 13, 19 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); International
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (deny-
ing immediate review of discovery orders in a civil antitrust suit because there was no
important wide-ranging issue in question), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980 (1974); see also
Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1969), in which the court stated,
We have detected what appears to be an irresistible impulse on the part of ap-
pellants to invoke the "collateral order" doctrine whenever the question of
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ever, there are a number of cases allowing immediate appeal of
certain discovery orders.5 9
In Reise, E.H. Reise applied for and was denied a position on
the faculty of the law school of the University of Wisconsin."
He filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin alleging that the Law School preferentially hired
minorities and that because he was a white male, he was not
hired. 6' He alleged that the law school's decision not to hire
him caused him illness, emotional distress, and mental anguish, for
which he sought compensatory damages. 62
The law school claimed that Reise had put his mental health
in issue and thus requested an order to compel him to undergo a
mental examination pursuant to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 6 ' Reise claimed that because he had recovered
from his injuries, the examination would be useless. Judge Shabaz
issued the order.' 6 Reise appealed the issuance of the order to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He claimed
that under the collateral order doctrine established in Cohen,6 5
the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear an appeal of this issue
before the case was disposed of on its merits.66 The Court of
Appeals concluded that the order did not qualify for appeal under
the collateral order doctrine, because such orders can be effective-
ly reviewed on appeal from a final decision. 67
appealability arises. Were we to accept even a small percentage of these some-
time exotic invocations, this court would undoubtedly find itself reviewing more
"collateral" than "final" orders.
159. See Acosta v. Tenneco Oil Co., 913 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
an order that plaintiff submit to examination under Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure satisfies the Cohen requirements); Smith v. B.I.C. Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 198-99
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that denial of a protective order to protect against disclosure of
trade secrets satisfies the Cohen requirements); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594
F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that an order revoking a protective order involving
a third party satisfies the Cohen requirements), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Carr v.
Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that discovery orders may
be appealable when a governmental privilege is asserted in cases in which the govern-
ment is not a party), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
160. Reise, 957 F.2d at 293.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 294.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
166. Reise, 957 F.2d at 294.
167. Id. at 295-96.
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A discovery order such as the one in Reise is not a truly final
order. Thus, under the Wisconsin-ABA standard, one must turn to
the discretionary criteria. It is unlikely that appeal of this discov-
ery order would "materially advance ... the litigation" or "clarify
further proceedings.""16 The purpose of this category is to allow
interlocutory appeals when doing so would save the courts and
litigants the time and resources involved in litigating issues under
false assumptions borne of erroneous orders. It is plausible to
conclude that the order in this case furthers this purpose. If the
order was erroneous and were corrected immediately, the parties
might be more likely to settle or to attempt to use alternative
means to prove the state of Reise's mental health. However, simi-
lar benefits would accompany interlocutory appeal of most discov-
ery orders and it would be dangerous to open the floodgates. The
sounder conclusion would. be to hold that this category is not
satisfied. Even if the order compelling a mental examination was
erroneous and were corrected immediately, Reise's mental health
would still be at issue and the trial would not be substantially
shortened by interlocutory appeal.
The interlocutory appeal in question is also unlikely to "clarify
an issue of general importance in the administration of jus-
tice. ' ' 169 The order compelling a mental examination certainly is
important to the parties of Reise. However, the primary goal of
the general importance category is to allow interlocutory appeals
when it would benefit the legal system as a whole. The general
importance category would encompass orders that pose important
legal questions that would evade review if interlocutory appeal
were never allowed.
The critical issue, then, is whether denying appeal likely would
subject Reise to "substantial or irreparable injury.""0 The poten-
tial injury would occur if Reise were forced to undergo a mental
examination or risk losing his claim for damages. Reise could risk
168. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(2)(a) (West 1994).
169. Id. § 808.03(2)(c).
170. Subsection 808.03(2)(b) requires the appellate court to conclude that delay of
appeal "will . . . protect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury." Id. §
808.03(2)(b) (emphasis added). A reviewing court never can be absolutely sure that a
petitioner will be harmed by delaying review until it hears the appeal and concludes that
the trial court has made an error. The statute should be read as requiring the substantial
likelihood of harm rather than definite harm. The statute seems to have been interpreted
this way. See, e.g., State v. Jenich, 292 N.W.2d 348, 349 (Wis. 1980).
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his claim by refusing the examination. He then would face the
sanctions available under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. The most likely sanction would be striking Reise's
claim for damages resulting from mental and physical distress.'
Reise then could challenge the order striking his claim after a final
decision, but if he were to lose this appeal, he would lose his
claim for damages.
Wrongfully forcing someone to undergo a mental examination
imposes a substantial irreparable harm. A forced medical exami-
nation is intrusive and once a litigant undergoes an examination, a
reviewing court cannot undo the examination. However, in order
for the harm to be wrongful, the order compelling the examination
must be erroneous. Thus, in determining whether there is a sub-
stantial likelihood of injury, the appellate court must consider to
the merits of Reise's challenge.172 There is not a substantial like-
lihood of injury to Reise because he does not have a very strong
case against the order. 73 He made a claim for damages for emo-
tional distress, which put his mental health at issue. In addition, if
the court of appeals were to review the order, the standard of
review would be abuse of discretion.174
If experience were to demonstrate that a class of orders, such
as discovery orders, most often do not satisfy the Wisconsin-ABA
criteria, then appellate courts should not hesitate to provide liti-
gants with guidance through opinions indicating this tendency.1 75
Such opinions could not per se deny interlocutory appeal of a
class of orders without running afoul of the terms of the discre-
tionary statute. However, such opinions could discuss the court's
reasoning for denying appeal of an order that the court finds typi-
cal of similar orders that it has denied appeal in the past.
171. Reise v. Board of Regents, 957 F.2d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1992).
172. Collapsing the inquiry into an assessment of the merits of the underlying appeal
has already occurred in Wisconsin. State v. Webb, 467 N.W.2d 108, 112 (Wis.) ("The
[appellant] must also show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits."), cert. de.
nied, 112 S. Ct. 249 (1991).
173. Although Judge Easterbrook did not address the merits of Reise's claim, his
hostile language indicated that he did not think it had merit. Reise, 957 F.2d at 293, 295
("Reise is engaged in jousting .... It is too late in the day to waste words .... .
174. Id. at 295.
175. A Westlaw search revealed only two unpublished Wisconsin decisions allowing
appeal of a discovery order. See Balogh v. Warren, 393 N.W.2d 799 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986)
(unpublished disposition available on Westlaw); Nelson v. O'Horo, 375 N.W.2d 220 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1985) (unpublished disposition available on Westlaw); Search of Westlaw, WIS-
CS database (Sept. 27, 1994).
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B. Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Authority v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc.
In Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf &
Eddy, Inc.,'76 the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority
(PRASA) contracted with Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. to help PRASA
comply with an Environmental Protection Agency consent de-
cree.177 When PRASA withheld payments on the contract be-
cause of alleged overcharging, Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. brought suit
in the District Court of Puerto Rico for breach of contract. 78
PRASA claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity as an "arm of
the state" and moved to dismiss.'79 The district court found that
PRASA was not an arm of the state and denied the motion. The
First Circuit refused to hear an interlocutory appeal.80
The Supreme Court has held that orders denying motions to
dismiss on grounds of qualified and absolute immunity from suit
are categorically allowed interlocutory appeal under the collateral
order doctrine.' In such cases, as in Metcalf & Eddy, the defen-
dant is claiming "an immunity from suit rather than a mere de-
fense to liability[, which] is effectively lost if a case is erroneously
permitted to go to trial."'" Thus, the collateral order doctrine
allows for interlocutory appeals of orders denying claims of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity as well regardless of the merits of the
immunity defense.
Under the Wisconsin-ABA approach, PRASA's claim of im-
munity from suit would no longer be appealable as of right re-
gardless of the merits of the immunity claim. As with discovery
orders, an order denying dismissal is not truly final." 4
Under the discretionary criteria, an interlocutory appeal in this
case would not likely "[c]larify an issue of general importance'5185
176. 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993).
177. Id. at 686.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 686.
181. Id. at 687 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731 (1982)).
182. Id. (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).
183. Id. at 686 n.1, 689 ("We . . . express no view on the merits of the immunity
claim."); id. at 689.
184. See supra text accompanying note 25.
185. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 808.03(2)(a) (West 1994).
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because the substantive issues in the immunity claim could be
addressed on appeal from final judgment. However, early resolu-
tion of the immunity claim might "[m]aterially advance the termi-
nation of the litigation[,] ... clarify further proceedings[, or
p]rotect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury."186
Whether there is a substantial likelihood that these standards will
be met hinges on an assessment of the merits of PRASA's claim
of error."8 7 If the denial of the immunity defense was erroneous,
then PRASA will be subject to the irreparable, potentially substan-
tial burdens of trial. Furthermore, the entire trial will be moot if
the denial of the immunity defense is overturned on appeal.
Applying the Wisconsin-ABA approach to PRASA's claims
demonstrates that if this approach is adopted, many orders denying
claims of immunity from suit may be denied interlocutory review.
Even if the defendant has a meritorious claim, which certainly
would not always be the case, the ultimate decision to hear an
interlocutory appeal would depend on the discretion of the courts
of appeals. Congress, the courts, or the rulemakers would have to
address directly whether claims of immunity should categorically or
presumptively be allowed interlocutory appeal as an exception to
the broad discretionary standards of the Wisconsin-ABA approach.
Ultimately such a decision would turn on an assessment of the
extent of harm if an erroneous order of a given type were left in
place until a final decision was issued and on the likelihood that a
given class of orders is erroneous. With discovery orders, for in-
stance, although the harm will vary, the reversal rate is likely low
because the standard of review is abuse of discretion."s On the
other hand, in cases of qualified official immunity, the reversal
rate is high 89 and the potential harm is great because the immu-
nity is from facing trial altogether. 90
CONCLUSION
Currently, whether interlocutory appeals are allowed is deter-
mined by a patchwork of judge-made and statutory rules. The
186. Id. § 808.03(2).
187. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
189. Solimine, supra note 18, at 1190 (estimating a reversal rate of five times that in
other cases).
190. See supra note 62.
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various exceptions to the final judgment rule are overlapping,
confusing, and often inefficient. With the passage of 28 U.S.C.
sections 2072(c) and 1292(e), which allow the rulemakers to define
"final" under section 1291 and add categories to section 1292, the
time has come to tear apart the judicially created patches of this
crazy quilt and start sewing anew.
The rulemakers should adopt the first portion of the Wiscon-
sin-ABA approach, deciding that final means final. This change
would eliminate the judicially created exceptions to the final judg-
ment rule and would force those who control appellate jurisdiction
to address the issue of interlocutory appeals directly. The rule-
makers should then adopt the second portion of the Wisconsin-
ABA approach, allowing for broad discretionary review. Such
review would provide the courts with the flexible power needed to
respond to requests for interlocutory appeals. In the future, narrow
categories of orders that should be allowed or denied interlocutory
appeal presumably could be superimposed on this discretionary
scheme.
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